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Abstract: The Westchester Day School and the Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA) of the 
Village of Mamaroneck were involved with several lawsuits stemming from a rescinded 
“negative” State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA) determination by the ZBA 
after local public outcry of the school’s expansion.  This article explores the relationship 
between Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and land use 
regulations, and comes to the conclusions that Congress enacted the RLUIPA to ensure 
religious organization landowners are not singled out to bear the burdens of the general 




Westchester Day School v. Village of Mamaroneck, 280 F. Supp. 2d 230 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003), involved a Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 
(“RLUIPA”) challenge to the denial of an application by an Orthodox Jewish day school 
for modification of its special permit.   The court granted plaintiff’s motion for summary 
judgment overturning the denial and ordering the issuance of the permit.  In October 
2001, Westchester Day School (“WDS”) submitted an application for modification of its 
special permit to allow construction of a new classroom building and renovation of two 
existing buildings to accommodate its student population.  After several months of 
public hearings and collecting comments from professionals, the Zoning Board of 
Appeals (“ZBA”), the board responsible for issuing the permit modification, unanimously 
voted to issue a “negative declaration” under the State Environmental Quality Review 
Act, finding that no significant adverse environmental impacts would result.  “Shortly 
thereafter, an outcry of community opposition arose and … the ZBA voted unanimously 
to hold a rehearing to review its ‘negative declaration’ determination.”  Westchester Day 
School v. Village of Mamaroneck, 236 F. Supp. 2d 349, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).  Following 
the rehearing and additional public hearings, the ZBA voted to rescind the negative 
declaration.  Id. 
 
WDS sued the village of Mamaroneck, the ZBA and its members (the “village”) 
for placing unconstitutional burdens on its right to expand and improve the school and 
sought relief under RLUIPA.  The court ruled that the rescission of the “negative 
declaration” was invalid because it was not based on “any change in the Project or any 
new evidence, but in response to belated public outcry”, and therefore the “negative 
declaration” was “still in full force and effect.”  Id. at 359.  In light of it’s holding, the court 
did not address the RLUIPA claims. 
 
After the court’s order, the ZBA held several public hearings and participated in a 
conference before the court.  At the court’s request, the ZBA gave the WDS a list of 
outstanding issues that might impede the issuance of the modification to the special 
permit and the WDS responded to all issues.  Following an additional two months of 
deliberations, the ZBA voted 3-2 to adopt a resolution denying WDS’s application in its 
entirety.   
 
The WDS again sued the village claiming that the denial constituted a substantial 
burden of its religious freedom in violation RLUIPA.  Westchester Day School v. Village 
of Mamaroneck, 280 F. Supp. 2d 230 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).  RLUIPA prevents federal, state 
and local governments from “imposing or implementing land use regulation in a manner 
that imposes a substantial burden on religious exercise”.  42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2000).  If 
a prima facie case is established, the government must demonstrate that its regulation 
furthers “a compelling governmental interest” and is the “least restrictive measure of 
furthering that interest.”  Id. 
 
The WDS claimed that the denial of its application violated RLUIPA because the 
existing buildings are not large enough and too decrepit to serve all of its students and 
carry on its mission of religious instruction: a matter involving the free exercise of their 
religion.  The village challenged the constitutionality of RLUIPA claiming that RLUIPA 
does not merely enforce a constitutional right, Free Exercise, but defines it, a power 
reserved for the courts.    
 
The district court held “RLUIPA does not ‘contradict vital principles necessary to 
maintain separation of powers and the federal balance.’”  The court found that RLUIPA 
narrowly focuses on “low visibility decisions” such as land use actions that risk 
“idiosyncratic application.”  Westchester Day School, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 237 (citing 
Freedom Baptist Church of Delaware County v. Township of Middletown, 204 F. Supp. 
2d 857, 873-4 (E.D. Pa. 2002)).  The court also held that RLUIPA is a permissible 
exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause because its power over 
economic activity is broad and that “religious buildings actively used as the site for a full 
range of activities” affect interstate commerce.  Id. at 238.  The court concluded that 
RLUIPA does not violate the Establishment Clause or the Tenth Amendment. 
 
Once the court established the constitutionality of RLUIPA, it determined that the 
denial of the application violated the Act.  As required by the Act, WDS made a prime 
facie showing that RLUIPA had been violated by establishing that the village’s denial of 
its application “(1) imposes a substantial burden; (2) on the ‘religious exercise’; (3) of a 
person, institute or assembly.”  Id. at 239.  A substantial burden under the Act is 
established when a regulation “compel[s] action or inaction with respect to a sincerely 
held belief; mere inconvenience to the religious institution or adherent is insufficient.”  
Id. at 240. The court concluded “the denial is a substantial burden on [WDS’s] exercise 
of religion because the modifications WDS seeks will enable it, for well into the 
foreseeable future, to more efficiently, effectively and, most importantly, safely serve its 
student population and fulfill its religious and educational mission.”  Id. at 243.   
 
Having established a prima facie case, the burden shifted to the village to 
demonstrate that the regulation furthers a compelling government interest and that it is 
the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling interest.  The village argued that 
the permit modification would negatively impact traffic and parking conditions in the 
neighborhood.  However, the court found that “traffic concerns have never been 
deemed a compelling government interest” and nothing was presented to show that lack 
of parking spaces “will result in direct and immediate threat to public, health, safety or 
welfare.” Id. at 242.  Finding no issues of material fact, the court granted WDS motion 
for partial summary judgment on its RLUIPA claim and set aside the ZBA’s denial of 
WDS’s application.  The case is currently before the Second Circuit for review. 
 
Background of RLUIPA 
  
In 1990, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Employment Division Services v. Smith, 
494 U.S. 872  (1990), that the government need not show a compelling basis for 
burdening a religious organization or person engaged in obeying religious dictates when 
it imposes a facially neutral requirement of general applicability.  This meant that laws of 
general applicability, like zoning codes, would be analyzed under the lenient rational 
basis test.  This decision prompted religious and political groups to lobby Congress to 
restore the religious protections the Smith decision had removed, in their opinion 
 
Three years later, the Supreme Court, in Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of 
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531-32 (1993), ruled that Smith applies only when the law is 
both neutral and generally applicable, and “a law failing to satisfy these requirements 
must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and must be narrowly tailored to 
advance that interest.”  This ruling did not appease those that sought to overturn Smith 
and, in that same year, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(“RFRA”).  42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1993).  RFRA applied a strict scrutiny test to all laws 
burdening religious practice.  
 
   In the City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), the Supreme Court struck 
down the sweeping, popularly supported RFRA statute as an attempt by Congress to 
interpret the substantive rights protected by the Constitution and to decide cases and 
controversies, a power reserved to the courts.  Justice Kennedy writing for a 6-3 
majority, labeled RFRA’s strict scrutiny language “the most demanding test known to 
constitutional law,” which in this context reflects “a lack of proportionality or congruence 
between the means adopted and the legitimate end to be achieved.” Id. at 534.  
Congressional hearings attending the adoption of RFRA had not revealed recent 
evidence of laws targeting religious practice or motivated by discriminatory intent.  
“RFRA,” Kennedy wrote, “was designed to control cases and controversies, such as the 
one before us; but as the provisions of the federal statute here invoked are beyond 
congressional authority, it is this Court’s precedent, not RFRA, which must control.” Id. 
at 536.   
 
In response to Boerne, Congress adopted the Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) which was more narrowly focused than RFRA 
and which was based on significant fact finding by Congress.  According to the hearing 
record - “[c]hurches in general, and new, small, or unfamiliar churches in particular, are 
frequently discriminated against on the face of zoning codes and also in the highly 
individualized and discretionary processes of land use regulation.”  It found that recent 
trends in the manner that Americans worship have resulted in increased disputes over 
the application of local zoning ordinances to religious uses of property.  These findings 
are significant because, as the Boerne court admitted, Congress may enforce 
Constitutional guarantees when it has "reason to believe that many of the laws affected 
by the congressional enactment have a significant likelihood of being unconstitutional."  
City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532.  
 
RLUIPA applies to local land use decisions that involve individualized 
assessments of proposals by religious institutions for a variety of permits and approvals.  
It requires local governments to implement land use regulations in a manner that treats 
religious assembly or institution on equal terms, is nondiscriminatory, and does not 
exclude or unreasonably limit religious assembly within a jurisdiction.  42 U.S.C. § 
2000cc (2000).   
 
 The Westchester Day School case is one of a number of recent federal court 
cases that involve challenges to local land use decisions.  In Civil Liberties for Urban 
Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752 (7th Cir. 2003), the Seventh Circuit 
interpreted the application of RLUIPA’s substantial burden requirement narrowly holding 
that the time and expense required to meet land use permit requirements cannot 
constitute a violation because such a finding “would require municipal governments not 
merely to treat religious land uses on an equal footing, but rather to favor them in the 
form of an outright exemption from land use regulations.”  Id. at 762.  In the opinion of 
the Urban Believers majority, the outcome of RLUIPA challenges will rest on whether 
the court interprets RLUIPA’s substantial burden element broadly, subjecting any 
burden to the strict scrutiny test, or narrowly limiting applicability to burdens that render 
religious exercise “impracticable”.   Id. at 761.   
 
To date, there are no federal appellate court rulings on the constitutionality of 
RLUIPA as that statute deals with the protection of land use as religious exercise.  The 
few district court cases that have ruled on the constitutionality of RLUIPA’s Land Use 
provisions have addressed the “individualized assessment” jurisdictional element, which 
invokes Congress’s power under the Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the 
Commerce Clause jurisdictional element.   In Freedom Baptist Church of Delaware 
County, the court ruled that RLUIPA's provisions are more narrowly directed than those 
of RFRA.  204 F. Supp. 2d at 873-4.  RLUIPA is confined to the Spending and 
Commerce Clauses, except for those cases where the government makes individual 
assessments, and this is consistent with Smith.  “[T]he statute draws the very line Smith 
itself drew when it distinguished neutral laws of general applicability from those ‘where 
the State has in place a system of individual exemptions,’ but nevertheless ‘refuses to 
extend that system to cases of “religious hardship.”’”  Id. (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 
884).  In contrast, the court in Elsinore Christian Ctr. v. City of Lake Elsinore, 291 F. 
Supp. 2d 1083 (C.D. Cal. 2003) held that RLUIPA does more than codify the Supreme 
Court’s “individualized assessment” jurisprudence and exceeds the scope of the 
Commerce Clause because it regulates land use laws and not economic activity.  The 
Commerce Clause authorizes Congress to regulate interstate commerce directly; it 
does not authorize Congress to regulate state governments' regulation of interstate 
commerce.  According to the Elsinore court, “[b]ecause Section 2(a) of RLUIPA 
regulates the way States regulate private parties, Congress's Commerce Clause 




 The lesson learned from the Westchester Day School case has to do with 
fairness.  The courts have exhibited hostility to locals land use decisions that single out 
particular land owners to bear particular burdens that are not based on facts on the 
record of the proceedings, or that respond solely to citizen opposition.  In adopting 
RLUIPA, Congress was concerned that vociferous opponents hold too much sway in 
decisions on individual land use applications by religious institutions.  The Westchester 
Day School court was moved by evidence that the Mamaroneck ZBA’s denial was not 
based on any compelling governmental interest or on a fair balancing of environmental 
concerns with the rights of WDS to the reasonable use of its property and that 
defendants’ abrupt reversal of its prior approval and its 3-2 vote to deny plaintiff’s 
Application was a reaction to belated public outcry, a paradigm of what has been 
referred to as the NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard) syndrome. Westchester Day School, 
280 F. Supp. 2d at 243. 
